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**Multilateralism**

**Embargo destroys global US credibility and causes militarism– only lifting solves**

**Grandin 10** – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” *New Labor Forum*, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

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Washington’s relations with Latin America—particularly in terms of the gap between what its policy toward the region is and what it could be—precisely measure the degree to which domestic ideologies, narrow corporate and sectional interests, and a sclerotic political system are hastening the decline of the United States as a global power. As a result, **the U.S. is deepening its dependence on unstable policies in order to leverage its dwindling influence** in the hemisphere. It is easy to imagine an improved U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America, designed not to advance a set of altruistic ideals but merely to defend its interests—broadly defined to mean stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and commodities—and to achieve what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long advocated:  a **maximization of U.S. “soft power**.” Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as “**the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion,” through** an enhanced understanding and utilization of **multilateral institutions**, mutually beneficial policies, cultural exchanges, **and commercial relations**.1 There are no immediate threats to the U.S. in Latin America. A majority of the region’s political elite—even most of its current govern- ing leftists—share many of the same values the United States claims to embody, even more so following the election of the first African-American president, who is wildly popular in Latin America. As a result, **there is no other place in the world that offers** U.S. president Barack **Obama the opportunity to put into place** the kind of **intelligent foreign policy** that he and his closest advisors, such as United Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is **necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of U.S. prestige**—one that **would** both **improve Washington’s ability to deploy** its many **competitive advantages, while removing key points of friction**. Here’s what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede to longstanding Brazilian demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to Brazilian com- modities, especially soy and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol. It would yield on other issues that have stalled the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those infected with the HIV virus. Such concessions would provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be meaningless without Brazil, South America’s largest and most dynamic economy. ¶ The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombia—including recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—who is entering the last year of his second and last term—has become the spokesperson for the collective discontent, an indication of his country’s regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-to-be post-Lula Brazil might find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and toward the United States. **Washington would** also **drop the** five-decade-old trade **embargo on Cuba**, thus burying a Cold War relic **that continues to tarnish the U.S. image. Normalizing relations** with Cuba **would create an additional enticement for Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest in Cuba and is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market**. Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even as it set up a de facto arrangement with Brazil to administer the region. This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, it would mean leashing the quasi-privatized “democracy promotion” organizations—largely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run by the International Republican Institute—that have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admitted—they fund oppositional “civil soci- ety” groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and humyn rights to menace Left govern- ments throughout the region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2 Similar destabilization efforts tried to topple Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards. It would be easy for the Obama administration to rein these groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable. Washington would also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed “War on Drugs,” as Latin America’s leading intellectuals and policymakers—including many former presidents—are demanding; in the last few months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and heroin.3 The U.S. would renew its assault weapons ban, as Mexico—battered by over five thousand narcotics-related murders a year, many of them committed with smuggled U.S. guns—is begging. It could also pass meaningful immigration reform, providing a path to U.S. citizenship for the millions of undocumented Latin Americans, mostly from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andes, but also Brazil. Such a move would go a long way toward improving relations with south- ern neighbors. It would also be good domestic politics for the Democrats, guaranteeing the loyalty of the Latino vote in 2012 and moving Texas, by creating millions of new vot- ers, closer to swing-state status. It could also provide progressives and the Democratic Party with a real wedge issue: Catholics, increasingly pulled into the con- servative camp by issues such as abortion and gay rights, overwhelmingly favor immigration reform. Any one of the above steps would go far in reestablishing U.S. legitimacy in Latin America. Taken together they could serve as a diplomatic revolution, one which would not weaken U.S. power but consolidate it much the way the Good Neighbor Policy did, allowing Washington to project its power in the region through stable multilateral mechanisms freed from the burdens of confrontation and militarism. A retooled FTAA, updated for the post-Great Recession world and stripped of the ideologi- cal baggage of failed neoliberal globalization, might provide a blueprint for a sustainable regional economy, one that balances national development and corporate profit.4 And like the Good Neighbor Policy, **a reinvigorated hemispheric diplomacy could serve as a model for the rest of the world, a design for a practical twenty-first century multilateralism, capable of responding to transnational problems**—both those that concern liberals, such as climate change, poverty, and migration, and those that concern conservatives, such as crime and ter- rorism—while respecting, at least rhetorically, the sovereignty of individual nations. In short, the Western Hemisphere offers an unparalleled opportunity to realize the vision of Barack Obama’s September 2009 address to the United Nations—hailed by many as a clarion call for a new internationalism—to, in his words, “embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” It’s not going to happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be blocked by powerful domestic interests. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a further indicator of how foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. The U.S. political system seems to be literally devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world. Unable to leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere, **Washington is ever more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary forces** that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes. As a candidate, Obama—referring to Bush’s decision to invade Iraq—said he wasn’t opposed to all wars, just stupid ones. Washington’s “War on Drugs” in Latin America is the stupid- est war one can imagine. As the centerpiece of that war, “Plan Colombia”—a program, established by Bill Clinton and extended by George W. Bush and Barack Obama, that has provided Colombia with billions of dollars of aid, mostly for the military’s counternarcotic and counterinsurgent operations—has served to entrench paramilitary power, enrich pri- vate contractors (such as the Virginia-based DynCorp), and turn more than four million Colombians into refugees.9 It has also fore- closed the possibility of a negotiated, regionally brokered solution to the crisis and inflamed a conflict that has already once spilled beyond national borders—in March 2008, Colombian troops launched a military raid into Ecuador to assassinate members of the insurgent Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. And, while it has not lessened narcotics exports to the United States, the drug war has spread the violence associated with the illegal narcotics trade up through Central America and into Mexico, accounting for the staggeringly high number of homicides in the region. Much like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Washington’s militarization of the drug problem in Latin America has worsened what it sought to solve, thus pro- viding an excuse for even more militarism. Thus Southcom—which runs the Department of Defense’s South American operations—is expanding its presence in Colombia, recently brokering a deal that will give the U.S. military access to at least seven bases, running from the Caribbean to the Andes. Colombia and the U.S. insist that this expansion is directed to ensure Colombia’s internal security; but Brazil’s military is concerned that the bases give the U.S. the ability to project its power deep into South America. Colombia serves as the anchor of a broader strategic shift on the part of the U.S., one that reflects its position as a declining hegemon. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the U.S.— confident of its ascension as a world power—treated Latin America largely as a unified region, working through inter-American organizations set up via the Good Neighbor Policy and during World War II, such as the OAS and the Rio Pact (a mutual defense treaty that became the model for NATO). When one or another country tried to break out of its dependent relationship with the U.S.—i.e., Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the 1980s—the U.S. took independent, often covert steps either to isolate it or bring it back into the fold. Yet throughout the Cold War (and for about a decade following the Cold War), Washington continued to view the region as a single administrative zone. But today, **the U.S. is increasingly relying on a strategy of divide and rule**. Washington’s relationship with Colombia is the centerpiece of this new approach, and the Andean country functions as something like Latin America’s Israel: a heavily militarized U.S. ally that allows Washington to project its power into a hostile region. Like Israel, its preemptive, unilateral actions are encouraged by Washington in the name of national security. Colombia’s reckless raid into Ecuador in 2008—denounced by every South American country—was endorsed not just by George W. Bush but by then- U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama. Like Israel, Colombia’s security forces serve as a model and a resource for wars elsewhere. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairmyn of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has commented that “many of us from all over the world can learn from what has happened with respect to the very successful develop- ments of ‘Plan Colombia,’” and suggested that it be franchised “specifically to Afghanistan.”10 Some of private military contractor Xe’s—née Blackwater—best recruits are retired Colombian soldiers, trained for Middle East operations on Colombian military bases; before taking control of the murderous Iraq Special Operations Forces, U.S. brigadier gen- eral Simeon Trombitas served in Colombia.11 Recently, Colombian paramilitaries have been recruited as mercenaries by Honduran plantation owners, to protect their property in the+ wake of the crisis unleashed by the coup.12 Colombia also boasts one of the most sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in its region—bolstered by massive infusions of U.S. dollars—capable of carrying out not just widespread surveillance but covert operations, including attempts to destabilize neighboring Venezuela.13 On the diplomatic circuit, an embassy posting in Colombia has become a way station toward a more prominent role in the Great Game. Current ambassadors to Afghanistan and Pakistan—William Wood and Anne Paterson, respectively—previously served as Bush’s envoys to Colombia. Like Israel, Colombia inspires many who see it as an exemplar of how to balance democracy—a place that offers relatively free elections, with three independent (at least in principle) branches of government—and security. “Colombia is what Iraq should eventually look like, in our best dreams,” writes influen- tial Atlantic contributor Robert Kaplan. “Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has fought—and is winning—a counterinsurgency war even as he has liberalized the economy, strengthened institutions, and improved humyn rights.”14 The Council on Foreign Relations has put aside its earlier strong criticism of “Plan Colombia” and now hails it as a success for having established a state presence in “many regions previously con- trolled by illegal armed groups, reestablishing elected governments, building and rebuilding public infrastructure, and reaffirming the rule of law.” The Council recommends a similar solution for violence-plagued Mexico and Central America.15 Throughout Latin America, a resurgent Right looks to Colombia for inspira- tion and Uribe as its standard bearer, a backstop against Hugo Chávez-style populism. As Forrest Hylton has argued, Uribe’s suc- cess at consolidating power rests on an alliance between death-squad paramilitaries—who have used “Plan Colombia” as a cover to execute an enormous land grab and to establish their rule in the countryside—and drug traffickers who have decided to stop fighting the state and become part of it. Medellín, the showcase city of Latin America’s New Right, has the eighth highest murder rate in the world; Uribe himself has deep ties to both paramilitaries and drug cartels.16 Colombia also serves as an anchor to a new geopolitics, an attempt by Washington to build a “security corridor” running from Mexico, through Central America, and into Colombia. Under the auspices of such programs as the Merida Initiative, “Plan Puebla-Panama,” and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the objective is to integrate the region’s trans- portation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution network, and, most importantly, its military capacities. Call it top-down, transnational state forma- tion, an attempt to coordinate the region’s intelligence agencies, militaries, and police (as well as mercenary corporations like DynCorp), subordinated under the direction of the U.S. military. Thomas Shannon, Bush’s envoy to Latin America and now Obama’s ambassador to Brazil, described it in a moment of candor as “armoring NAFTA.” In other words, the U.S. is retrenching, pulling back from efforts to preside over the entirety of Latin America, instead consolidating its authority over a circumscribed territory, with **a deepening reliance on applied military power. This shift is significant, and could unleash a period of heightened instability**. One consequence of Washington’s past strategy of treating Latin America as a single unit was that inter-state conflicts were contained; since the 1930s, most bloodletting was internally directed, aimed at trade unionists, peasant activists, intellectuals, reformist politicians, and progressive religious leaders demanding a more equitable share of economic and political power. But now, **with a waning superpower banking its authority on “armoring” one region in order to contain another, that might be changing**—as evinced by Colombia’s 2008 raid into Ecuador and recent tensions caused by U.S. plans to expand its military footprint in the Andean country. As Adam Isacson, of the Center for International Policy, says of Washington’s new Colombian bases, the U.S. is “creating a new capability in South America, and capabilities often get used.”17 Adding to the potential for instability is the regrouping of the Right. Political scientist Miguel Tinker-Salas notes that “for some time, the Right has been rebuilding in Latin America; hosting conferences, sharing experiences, refining their message, working with the media, and building ties with allies in the United States. This is not the lunatic right-wing fringe, but rather the mainstream Right with powerful allies in the middle-class that used to consider themselves center, but have been frightened by recent Left electoral victories and the rise of social movements.”18 This nascent reaction has been buoyed by the June 2009 Honduran coup, which the right-wing sees as the first successful rollback of populism since the 2004 overthrow of Aristide, as well as by recent victories at the ballot box: in May, a conservative millionaire won the presidency in Panama. In Argentina, Cristina Fernández’s center-left Peronist party has recently suffered a midterm electoral defeat and lost control of Congress. And polls show that presidential elections coming up in Chile and Brazil will be close, possibly dealing further losses to progressives, containing the South American Left to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the Central American Left to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two broad arcs of crises have defined U.S.-Latin American relations. The first began in the early nineteenth century and paralleled the first, youthful phase of U.S. territorial and economic expansion. Latin American intellectuals, politicians, and nationalists reacted with increasing hostility toward not only the growing influence of U.S. capital—which both displaced European economic interests and subordinated aspiring domestic elites—but toward ever more frequent and threatening military interventions: the Mexican-American War; the Spanish-American War; the creation of Panama; and invasions and occupations throughout the Caribbean basin. The second round coincided with the advent of the Cold War and marked the U.S.’s maturity as a global power. It intensified with Eisenhower’s over- throw of Guatemala’s democratically elected government in 1954, and continued with the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the series of right- wing coups in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating with the violent repression of Central American insurgencies in the 1980s, which paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s. It seems we are entering a third period of conflict—**this time driven** less **by** the tendency toward expansion that marked **the U.S.’s** global ascension than by a **frantic attempt to hold on to what it has left** as it enters its senescence—as domestic ideologues, unchecked corporate power, and political paralysis quicken the U.S.’s fall.

**AND, Lifting the embargo creates a credible and durable model for global multilateralism**

**Dickerson 10** – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//SJF¶ ¶

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At the international political level, President **Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism** and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007**, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba.** The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia andbother non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. ¶ While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humynitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. ¶ On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or **lifting the embargo** could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. **Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.** If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. ¶ Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.¶ Policy and National Interest¶ Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. ¶ From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7¶ The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmyn Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.¶ As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Humyn Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. ¶ The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Humyn Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15¶ By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.¶ The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.¶ A History of Anger and Distrust¶ After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. ¶ Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. **The** underlying **fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the** first diplomatic **pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations**. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. **Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations**. Humyn rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. ¶ **The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress** between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20¶ Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26¶ Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.¶ It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.¶ Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and **economic engagement** in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. ¶ To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. ¶ As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. ¶ Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis¶ Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. ¶ The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.¶ How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.¶ Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.¶ In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and humyn rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.¶ Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?¶ Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems. ¶ While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.¶ Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis¶ If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow. ¶ The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally**, we must loosen embargo restrictions** and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.¶ Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.¶ We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on humyn rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government. ¶ If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. **The** Ambassador’s **first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions**. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. **Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply** with the agreed bi-national or international terms. **It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba**. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections.¶ The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. **Delaying could** also **signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.¶** While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.¶ Conclusion¶ Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or **lifting the embargo could** also **be mutually beneficial**. **Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability** to **provide goods** and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President **Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other** seemingly “wicked **problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir**. President **Obama could leverage this international reputation with** other rogue **nations like Iran and North Korea** **who** might **associate their plight with Cuba**. **The U.S. could** begin to **lead again** and **reverse its perceived decline** in the greater global order **bringing true peace** for years to come.

**AND, That de-escalates conflicts and creates a system of cooperation**

**Powell 3**

(In Defense of Multilateralism, Lindsey Powell ¶ Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, 23-25 October 2003, http://www.yale.edu/gegdialogue/docs/dialogue/oct03/papers/Powell.pdf)rz¶

In defending multilateralism, I do not mean to suggest that it is a simple system for international ¶ cooperation. There is no simple system when so many actors are involved and the issues and ¶ stakes are so great. Among the many complex options, I agree with Ruggie’s assertion that ¶ multilateralism is one of the most demanding, as it requires states to resist the temptation of ¶ immediate national interest gratification.22 ¶ ¶ [However], the very features that make it strategically difficult to establish ¶ multilateral arrangements in the first place may enhance their durability and ¶ adaptability once in place. **An arrangement based on generalized organizing** ¶ **principles should be more elastic than one based on particularistic interests and** ¶ **situational exigencies. It should**, therefore, **also exhibit greater continuity in the** ¶ **face of changing circumstances, including international power shifts**.23 ¶ ¶ 21 Forman, Shepard. “Multilateralism as a Matter of Fact: U.S. Leadership and the Management of the ¶ International Public Sector.” Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement. Stewart ¶ Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 439. Forman here ¶ quotes from Patrick, “America’s Retreat from Multilateral Engagement,” 439. 22 Caporaso, James. “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations.” ¶ International Organization, 46, 3 (Summer, 1992), 604. 23 Ruggie, John. “Anatomy of an Institution.” Multilateralism Matters: Theory and Praxis of an ¶ Institution. John Ruggie, ed. New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, 32-33. ¶ 11What I hope to have demonstrated in this paper is that **multilateralism** offers both a short-term ¶ utilitarian value insofar as it provides developing states with a greater voice in international ¶ matters**, enables developed states to synchronize implementation of new environmental and** ¶ **economic policies, and facilitates mutually beneficial trade-offs between developed and** ¶ **developing states.** More important than **these short-term benefits**, however, is **the promise of** ¶ **multilateralism to provide the most tempered, egalitarian, and sustainable future.** As Forman ¶ succinctly states, “in this age of accelerated globalization**, multilateralism offers the most ¶ effective means to realize common goals and contain common threats.”2**

**AND, Specifically key to resolve Kashmir instability**

**Zulfqar 2/21**

(Kashmir: key to regional peace, Friday, February 21, 2014, Daily Times,http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/07-Feb-2014/kashmir-key-to-regional-peace)rz

Kashmir Solidarity Day was observed on February 5 wherein the people of Pakistan express solidarity with the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination. To express solidarity, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed a unanimous resolution reiterating Pakistan’s political, diplomatic and moral support for the Kashmiri people. Rallies were staged in different cities and human chains were formed at points that connect Azad Kashmir to Pakistan.¶ **Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan, and has been the direct or indirect cause of crises and wars between the two states**. **Both states have employed a bilateral as well as multilateral approach to resolve the conflict**. **Bilateral dialogue as a conflict resolution tool usually works successfully between equally powerful states.** **In circumstances where one state is smaller and relatively less powerful, it becomes unable to make the more powerful state comply with the terms of agreement; this applies to India and Pakistan as well. India does not respect bilateral agreements when it comes to Pakistan**.¶ **As far as the multilateral approach is concerned, India approached** the United Nations Security Council (**UNSC**) on January 1, 1948 on the **Kashmir issue**. Kashmir is the oldest issue on the agenda of the UNSC. **It passed a number of resolutions regarding the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir but India’s non-compliance with UN resolutions has not triggered any forceful action from the world body**.

**AND,** Cuba is uniquely key

Piccone 9 – senior fellow and deputy director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, specializes in U.S.-Latin American relations (Ted, “The United Nations Denounces the U.S. Embargo on Cuba … Again,” 10/27/9, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2009/10/27-cuba-un-vote-piccone)//SJF

¶ For the 18th year in a row, the United Nations General Assembly unequivocally calls for the end of "the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba." And once again, the United States finds itself completely isolated from even its closest friends in the international community.¶ It wasn’t supposed to be this way. President Obama is committed to a new course of multilateral engagement in which the United States reassumes its mantle of responsible global citizen. And in many ways, from the formal creation of the G-20 to re-joining the UN Human Rights Council, the administration has not just talked the talk, but walked the walk, earning him a rather premature though welcomed Nobel Peace Prize. ¶ But when it comes to Cuba, it’s back to the same old story: all politics is local, in this case, Miami, Florida. Earlier this year, there was some justified hope that, after eight years of an increasingly onerous set of laws and regulations restricting trade, travel and remittances between the United States and Cuba, President Obama would fulfill his promise to try a new path of pragmatic but principled engagement. And winning Florida last November – despite losing the majority of Cuban American votes in Miami – should have given the White House some elbow room to take some bold actions. But even supporters are disappointed by the excessively cautious steps this administration has taken so far to extend that "unclenched fist" to our closest island neighbor. ¶ If anything, the president seems to have limited his options by locking himself in to a policy of mutual reciprocity that lets Havana determine the pace of progress in unfreezing 50 years of icy relations. On more than one occasion, the president has reiterated his view that, in return for letting Cuban-American families travel and send remittances to their loved ones on the island, the Castro regime must take the next step toward better relations. He reportedly asked his Spanish counterpart, Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero, to tell President Raul Castro to get moving on democratic reforms. According to an unnamed U.S. official quoted in El Pais, Obama said, "We're taking steps, but if they don't take steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to continue." Of course, the fact that financial donations from pro-embargo Cuban Americans to the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee, which happens to be led by pro-embargo Cuban-American Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), have jumped six-fold since 2006 also may have something to do with this approach. It at least seems to reaffirm another old cliché: money talks.¶ While a tit-for-tat approach may assuage the shrinking number of hard-liners in Miami, it is unlikely to have any effect on the intended audience – the Cuban regime, now ruled by Fidel Castro’s "younger" brother (78 years old) and a cohort of aged revolutionaries. Cuba has made it very clear that it is prepared to sit down and talk with the United States in a spirit of mutual respect, i.e., accepting the regime as it is, rather than as we would like it to be. Until then, it will happily promote the image of David vs. Goliath on the world stage. It is just too potent and too successful a narrative in winning friends for Havana to abandon, even more so now that its economy is in a shambles and it needs all the friends it can get. ¶ Similarly, the modest steps the administration has taken so far is unlikely to get much mileage with the other group one would want to influence – the European and other allies who are rooting for a more multilateral, cooperative and pragmatic U.S. policy on this and a host of other issues. Washington will have to do much more to begin turning the tide of international public opinion against the embargo. This does not mean that the United States should abandon its defense of human rights for all Cubans. But it might want to change its tactics. Spain is touting its policy of quiet diplomacy as a better model for the European Union, which it chairs in 2010, and has a few, albeit meager concessions by Havana to back up its argument. We, after 50 years of attempting to punish Cuba for its bad behavior, have none.¶ So a policy designed to isolate a small, poor Caribbean island has come around full circle to isolate the superpower instead. The lopsided UN vote reminds us yet again that it’s time for a change.

**AND, Indo-Pak war causes extinction – best computer models**

**Toon and Robock**, Professors of Atmospheric Science, **10** [Toon - chair of the Dept of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a member of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado @ Boulder. Robock is a Proff of atmospheric science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey Local Nuclear War, Global Suffering; January 2010; Scientific American Magazine; 8 Page(s), http://www.sciamdigital.com/index.cfm?fa=Products.ViewIssuePreview&ISSUEID\_CHAR=944156A6-237D-9F22-E8E572150DCA8E65&ARTICLEID\_CHAR=97CA0A88-237D-9F22-E861FD76EBEE2611]

\*\*gender modified

Worry has focused on the U.S. versus Russia, but a regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan could blot out the sun, starving much of the humyn race Twenty-five years ago international teams of scientists showed that a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could produce a "nuclear winter." The smoke from vast fires started by bombs dropped on cities and industrial areas would envelop the planet and absorb so much sunlight that the earth's surface would get cold, dark and dry, killing plants **worldwide and** eliminating our food supply. Surface temperatures would reach winter values in the summer. International discussion about this prediction, fueled largely by astronomer Carl Sagan, forced the leaders of the two superpowers to confront the possibility that their arms race endangered not just themselves but the entire humyn race. Countries large and small demanded disarmament. Nuclear winter became an important factor in ending the nuclear arms race. Looking back later, in 2000, former Soviet Union leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev observed, "Models made by Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of honor and morality, to act." Why discuss this topic now that the cold war has ended? Because as other nations continue to acquire nuclear weapons, smaller, regional nuclear wars could create a similar global catastrophe. New analyses reveal that a conflict between India and Pakistan, for example, in which 100 nuclear bombs were dropped on cities and industrial areas--only 0.4 percent of the world's more than 25,000 warheads--would produce enough smoke to cripple global agriculture. A regional war could cause widespread loss of life even in countries far away from the conflict. Regional War Threatens the World By deploying modern computers and modern climate models, the two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our calculations the oceans and the entire atmosphere--also only now possible--we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heated and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth. India and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nuclear conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the U.K. have hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investigations, to begin evaluating what the global environmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our test case an engagement between India and Pakistan. The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to increase their arsenals. Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indicate that the yield of the warheads would be similar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima. Toon and Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiroshima-size bombs were dropped across the highest population-density targets in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across India. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt leaders would limit attacks in any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. Lavoy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for example, has analyzed the ways in which a conflict between India and Pakistan might occur and argues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces. Obviously, we hope the number of nuclear targets in any future war will be zero, but policy makers and voters should know what is possible. Toon and Turco found that more than 20 million people in the two countries could die from the blasts, fires and radioactivity--a horrible slaughter. But the investigators were shocked to discover that a tremendous amount of smoke would be generated, given the megacities in the two countries, assuming each fire would burn the same area that actually did burn in Hiroshima and assuming an amount of burnable material per person based on various studies. They calculated that the 50 bombs exploded in Pakistan would produce three teragrams of smoke, and the 50 bombs hitting India would generate four (one teragram equals a million metric tons). Satellite observations of actual forest fires have shown that smoke can be lofted up through the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere) and sometimes then into the lower stratosphere (the layer just above, extending to about 30 miles). Toon and Turco also did some "back of the envelope" calculations of the possible climate impact of the smoke should it enter the stratosphere. The large magnitude of such effects made them realize they needed help from a climate modeler. It turned out that one of us (Robock) was already working with Luke Oman, now at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, who was finishing his Ph.D. at Rutgers University on the climatic effects of volcanic eruptions, and with Georgiy L. Stenchikov, also at Rutgers and an author of the first Russian work on nuclear winter. They developed a climate model that could be used fairly easily for the nuclear blast calculations. Robock and his colleagues, being conservative, put five teragrams of smoke into their modeled upper troposphere over India and Pakistan on an imaginary May 15. The model calculated how winds would blow the smoke around the world and how the smoke particles would settle out from the atmosphere. The smoke covered all the continents within two weeks. The black, sooty smoke absorbed sunlight, warmed and rose into the stratosphere. Rain never falls there, so the air is never cleansed by precipitation; particles very slowly settle out by falling, with air resisting them. Soot particles are small, with an average diameter of only 0.1 micron (μm), and so drift down very slowly. They also rise during the daytime as they are heated by the sun, repeatedly delaying their elimination. The calculations showed that the smoke would reach far higher into the upper stratosphere than the sulfate particles that are produced by episodic volcanic eruptions. Sulfate particles are transparent and absorb much less sunlight than soot and are also bigger, typically 0.5 μm. The volcanic particles remain airborne for about two years, but smoke from nuclear fires would last a decade. Killing Frosts in Summer The climatic response to the smoke was surprising. Sunlight was immediately reduced, cooling the planet to temperatures lower than any experienced for the past 1,000 years. The global average cooling, of about 1.25 degrees Celsius (2.3 degrees Fahrenheit), lasted for several years, and even after 10 years the temperature was still 0.5 degree C colder than normal. The models also showed a 10 percent reduction in precipitation worldwide. Precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased because blocking sunlight reduces evaporation and weakens the hydrologic cycle. Drought was largely concentrated in the lower latitudes, however, because global cooling would retard the Hadley air circulation pattern in the tropics, which produces a large fraction of global precipitation. In critical areas such as the Asian monsoon regions, rainfall dropped by as much as 40 percent. The cooling might not seem like much, but even a small dip can cause severe consequences. Cooling and diminished sunlight would, for example, shorten growing seasons in the midlatitudes. More insight into the effects of cooling came from analyses of the aftermaths of massive volcanic eruptions. Every once in a while such eruptions produce temporary cooling for a year or two. The largest of the past 500 years, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia, blotted the sun and produced global cooling of about 0.5 degree C for a year; 1816 became known as "The Year without a Summer" or "Eighteen Hundred and Froze to Death." In New England, although the average summer temperature was lowered only a few degrees, crop-killing frosts occurred in every month. After the first frost, farmers replanted crops, only to see them killed by the next frost. The price of grain skyrocketed, the price of livestock plummeted as farmers sold the animals they could not feed, and a mass migration began from New England to the Midwest, as people followed reports of fertile land there. In Europe the weather was so cold and gloomy that the stock market collapsed, widespread famines occurred and 18-year-old Mary Shelley was inspired to write Frankenstein. Certain strains of crops, such as winter wheat, can withstand lower temperatures, but a lack of sunlight inhibits their ability to grow. In our scenario, daylight would filter through the high smoky haze, but on the ground every day would seem to be fully overcast. Agronomists and farmers could not develop the necessary seeds or adjust agricultural practices for the radically different conditions unless they knew ahead of time what to expect. In addition to the cooling, drying and darkness, extensive ozone depletion would result as the smoke heated the stratosphere; reactions that create and destroy ozone are temperature-dependent. Michael J. Mills of the University of Colorado at Boulder ran a completely separate climate model from Robock's but found similar results for smoke lofting and stratospheric temperature changes. He concluded that although surface temperatures would cool by a small amount, the stratosphere would be heated by more than 50 degrees C, because the black smoke particles absorb sunlight. This heating, in turn, would modify winds in the stratosphere, which would carry ozone-destroying nitrogen oxides into its upper reaches. Together the high temperatures and nitrogen oxides would reduce ozone to the same dangerous levels we now experience below the ozone hole above Antarctica every spring. Ultraviolet radiation on the ground would increase significantly because of the diminished ozone. Less sunlight and precipitation, cold spells, shorter growing seasons and more ultraviolet radiation would all reduce or eliminate agricultural production. Notably, cooling and ozone loss would be most profound in middle and high latitudes in both hemispheres, whereas precipitation declines would be greatest in the tropics. The specific damage inflicted by each of these environmental changes would depend on particular crops, soils, agricultural practices and regional weather patterns, and no researchers have completed detailed analyses of such agricultural responses. Even in normal times, however, feeding the growing humyn population depends on transferring food across the globe to make up for regional farming deficiencies caused by drought and seasonal weather changes. The total amount of grain stored on the planet today would feed the earth's population for only about two months [see "Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?" by Lester R. Brown; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May]. Most cities and countries have stockpiled food supplies for just a very short period, and food shortages (as well as rising prices) have increased in recent years. A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global agricultural trading system to a halt, with severe shortages in many places. Around one billion people worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with starvation by a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between other regional nuclear powers. Independent Evidence Needed Typically scientists test models and theories by doing experiments, but we obviously cannot experiment in this case. Thus, we look for analogues that can verify our models. Burned cities. Unfortunately, firestorms created by intense releases of energy have pumped vast quantities of smoke into the upper atmosphere. San Francisco burned as a result of the 1906 earthquake, and whole cities were incinerated during World War II, including Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events confirm that smoke from intense urban fires rises into the upper atmosphere. The seasonal cycle. In actual winter the climate is cooler because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense; the simple change of seasons helps us quantify the effects of less solar radiation. Our climate models re-create the seasonal cycle well, confirming that they properly reflect changes in sunlight. Eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in 1883 and Pinatubo in 1991 provide several lessons. The resulting sulfate aerosol clouds that formed in the stratosphere were transported around the world by winds. The surface temperature plummeted after each eruption in proportion to the thickness of the particulate cloud. After the Pinatubo eruption, the global average surface temperature dropped by about 0.25 degree C. Global precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased. Our models reproduce these effects. Forest fires. Smoke from large forest fires sometimes is injected into the troposphere and lower stratosphere and is transported great distances, producing cooling. Our models perform well against these effects, too. Extinction of the dinosaurs. An asteroid smashed into Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula 65 million years ago. The resulting dust cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked the Sun, killing the dinosaurs. Massive volcanism in India at the same time may have exacerbated the effects. The events teach us that large amounts of aerosols in the earth's atmosphere can change climate drastically enough to kill robust species. We have used such analogues to test and improve our models in the past. But we hope more people will do further work. Independent models that either verify or contradict ours would be very instructive. Agricultural impact studies, which we have not conducted, would be particularly welcomed. Abolition: The Only Policy People have several incorrect impressions about nuclear winter. One is that the climatic effects were disproved; this is just not true [see sidebar on page 78]. Another is that the world would experience "nuclear autumn" instead of winter. But our new calculations show that the climate effects even of a regional conflict would be widespread and severe. The models and computers used in the 1980s were not able to simulate the lofting and persistence of the smoke or the long time it would take oceans to warm back up as the smoke eventually dissipated; current models of a full-scale nuclear exchange predict a nuclear winter, not a nuclear fall.

**AND, Independently, absent new multilateral cooperation, Middle East instability goes nuclear**

**Russell 2009**

Naval Postgraduate School National Security professor, 2009 (James, "Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East",<http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/ccc/people/biolinks/russell/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf>) Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that **escalation** by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of **miscalc**ulation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or **nuclear weapons**. **It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries** between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the **probability** of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a **momentum** all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in **unpredictable** ways**. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster** for the peoples of the region, with substantial **risk for the entire world.**

**AND, Decline of economic and political power is inevitable – a signal of conforming to international norms is critical to prevent devastating backlash**

**Ikenberry ’2** John Ikenberry, Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice @ Georgetown, October 2002, and#34;Americaand#39;s Imperial Ambition—Foreign Affairs, lexis

**Pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy**, however**. Unchecked U.S. power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from the postwar norms and institutions of the international order**, **will usher in a more hostile international system, making it far harder to achieve American interests.** The secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda more acceptable to allies and other key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at risk by the administration's new thinking.¶ The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist approach is unsustainable. Going it alone might well succeed in removing Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy of counterproliferation, based on American willingness to use unilateral force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term. **An American policy that leaves the United States alone to decide which states are threats and how best to deny them weapons of mass destruction will lead to a diminishment of multilateral mechanisms -- most important of which is the nonproliferation regime**.¶ The Bush administration has elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering, monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come along -- when it is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral action to provide sanctions and inspections. Nor is it certain that a preemptive or preventive military intervention will go well; it might trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led and military-focused interventionism. **America's well-meaning imperial strategy could undermine the principled multilateral agreements, institutional infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success** of nonproliferation goals.¶ The specific doctrine of preemptive action poses a related problem: **once the United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other countries from doing the same.** Does the United States want this doctrine in the hands of Pakistan, or **even China** or Russia? After all, it would not require the intervening state to first provide evidence for its actions. The United States argues that to wait until all the evidence is in, or until authoritative international bodies support action, is to wait too long. Yet that approach is the only basis that the United States can use if it needs to appeal for restraint in the actions of others. Moreover, and quite paradoxically, overwhelming American conventional military might, combined with a policy of preemptive strikes, could lead hostile states to accelerate programs to acquire their only possible deterrent to the United States: WMD. This is another version of the security dilemma, but one made worse by a neoimperial grand strategy.¶ Another problem follows. The use of force to eliminate WMD capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilaterally or by a concert of major states. After the military intervention is over, the target country has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required, as are long-term strategies that bring the un, the World Bank, and the major powers together to orchestrate aid and other forms of assistance. This is not heroic work, but it is utterly necessary. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after a new regime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed by outside military intervention must also be calmed. This is the "long tail" of burdens and commitments that comes with every major military action.¶ When these costs and obligations are added to America's imperial military role, it becomes even more doubtful that the neoimperial strategy can be sustained at home over the long haul -- the classic problem of imperial overstretch. The United States could keep its military predominance for decades if it is supported by a growing and increasingly productive economy. But the indirect burdens of cleaning up the political mess in terrorist-prone failed states levy a hidden cost. Peacekeeping and state building will require coalitions of states and multilateral agencies that can be brought into the process only if the initial decisions about military intervention are hammered out in consultation with other major states. America's older realist and liberal grand strategies suddenly become relevant again.¶ A third problem with an imperial grand strategy is that it cannot generate the cooperation needed to solve practical problems at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the fight on terrorism, the United States needs cooperation from European and Asian countries in intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even more on a continuous stream of amicable working relations with major states around the world. It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization, environmental protection, deterring transnational organized crime, managing the rise of China, and a host of other thorny challenges. But it is impossible to expect would-be partners to acquiesce to America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue business as usual in all other domains.¶ The key policy tool for states confronting a unipolar and unilateral America is to withhold cooperation in day-to-day relations with the United States. One obvious means is trade policy; the European response to the recent American decision to impose tariffs on imported steel is explicable in these terms. This particular struggle concerns specific trade issues, but it is also a struggle over how Washington exercises power. **The United States may be a unipolar military power, but economic and political power is more evenly distributed across the globe. The major states may not have much leverage in directly restraining American military policy, but they can make the United States pay a price in other areas.**¶ Finally, **the neoimperial grand strategy poses a wider problem for the maintenance of American unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: self-encirclement. When the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around, unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the U**nited **S**tates **plays only by its own rules**. The **proponents of the new grand strategy have assumed that the U**nited **S**tates **can single-handedly deploy military power abroad** and not suffer untoward consequences; relations will be coarser with friends and allies, they believe, but such are the costs of leadership. But **history shows that powerful states tend to trigger self-encirclement by their own overestimation of their power.**

**AND, End of overall US primacy is not inevitable – smart policies maintain relative US power**

**Nye 13** — Joseph S. Nye, Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor and Former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2013 (“American power in the 21st century will be defined by the ‘rise of the rest’,” *Washington Post*, June 28th, Available Online at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-28/opinions/40255646\_1\_american-power-u-s-economy-united-states, Accessed 07-20-2013)

On the question of absolute — rather than relative — American decline, **the U**nited **S**tates **faces serious domestic problems** in debt, secondary education and political gridlock. **But these issues are only part of the picture. Of the many possible futures, stronger cases can be made for the positive over the negative**. Among the negative futures, the most plausible is one in which the United States overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inward and closing itself off to the strength it obtains from openness. But barring such mistaken strategies, **there are**, over a longer term, **solutions to the major problems that preoccupy us**. Of course, for political or other reasons, such solutions may remain forever out of reach. But **it is important to distinguish between situations that have no solutions and those that**, at least in principle, **can be solved.¶** **Decline is a misleading metaphor** and, fortunately, President Obama has rejected the suggested strategy of “managing decline.” As a leader in research and development, higher education and entrepreneurial activity, **the U**nited **S**tates **is not in absolute decline, as happened in** ancient **Rome. In relative terms, there is a reasonable probability that the United States is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in the coming decades**. We do not live in a “post-American world,” but neither do we live any longer in the “American era” of the late 20th century. **In terms of primacy, the United States will be “first” but not “sole.”** No one has a crystal ball, but the National Intelligence Council (which I once chaired) may be correct in its 2012 projection that although the unipolar moment is over, the United States probably will remain first among equals among the other great powers in 2030 because of the multifaceted nature of its power and legacies of its leadership.¶ The power resources of many states and non-state actors will rise in the coming years. U.S. presidents will face an increasing number of issues in which obtaining our preferred outcomes will require power with others as much as power over others. Our leaders’ capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of our hard and soft power. Simply put, **the problem of American power in the 21st century is not one of a poorly specified “decline”** or being eclipsed by China **but**, rather, **the “rise of the rest.” The paradox of American power is that even the largest country will not be able to achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others.**

**AND, Global trends and empirics prove the plan’s institutional credibility is the only way to effectively exercise leadership and check global violence**

**Kromah 9** (Lamii Moivi Kromah, Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, February 2009, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, <http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf>)

A final major gain to the United States from the Pax Americana has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States. This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership; post war reconstruction of Germany and Japan exhibit all these features. Moderates were giving a great voice in the way government business was done Constitutions in these countries were changed and amended to ensure democratic practices and martial elites were prosecuted. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."34 After WWII the U.S. established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and others. In each these new regimes it make Germany a member and eventual an integral partner. Germany's freedom of movement has been limited by domestic institutional constraints overlain by a dense network of **external institutional constraints** on autonomous decision making in the domains of security and economy. Thus a powerful combination of constitutional design, membership in integrative international institutions and the continued division of Germany achieved the post-war American objective of **'security** for Germany and security from Germany'.35 Others are even more sanguine about the prospect of an active German hegemony. One body of literature, such as Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?' International Affairs, 72 (1996), 9-32., focuses upon the constraining effects of Germany's 'exaggerated multilateralism' or a reliance upon 'indirect institutional power'." The institutionalization of German power has produced an empowered but non-threatening Germany that sets the European agenda and dominates the institutional evolution of the European Union (EU) and its governance structures.36 The cornerstone of German security policy is the perpetuation of NATO, including the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe and the U.S. nuclear guarantee. In 1994 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the U.S. presence as an "irreplaceable basis for keeping Europe on a stable footing," and that sentiment is echoed routinely by high German officials. German participation in the Western European Union and the Eurocorps has been based on the presumption that European military forces must be integrated into NATO rather than standing as autonomous units.37For industrial societies, the Second World War destroyed more wealth than it created because it disrupted the global trade on which wealth had come to depend. No longer could states gain in wealth by seizing territory and resources from each other as they had done during the mercantilist period in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. WWII broke the world power of the Western European states. Even without the advent of nuclear weapons, it drove home the lesson of the First World War that the major European states could no longer wage war amongst themselves without bringing about the political and physical impoverishment of their societies, and perhaps destroying them completely. By 1945 it was clear that all out war had become an irrational instrument in relations among major powers. Almost no conceivable national objective short of lastditch survival justified the costs of undertaking it. This lesson was as manifestly true for revolutionary workers’ states like the Soviet Union as it was for conservative, bourgeois, capitalist states like Britain and France.38 A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States.39 This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."40 After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that **other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent** that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project.41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. **benevolent hegemony** is what has kept the peace **since the end of WWII**. The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.43 America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the **rules and practices** that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers48, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”.51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony.52 If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership as been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesmyn put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.55 **By validating regimes and norms** of international behaviour the **U.S. has given incentives for actors,** small and large, in the international arena **to behave peacefully**. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own wellbeing depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security.57

**AND, Cuba’s uniquely key to re-establish US Institutional credibility**

**Burgsdorff, 9**– Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, <http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>)//NG

6.3 How would the international community react? At international level **all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo**. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the **foreign powers**, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries**, would clearly support a definite lifting** of the coercive measures. **Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness** in Washington **to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework.**

**AND, Nothing short of the plan sends an effective signal**

**Vivanco 6**- LLM from Harvard Law School, Americas director of Humyns Rights Watch

(Jose Miguel, “Restraint, not force, will bring change to Cuba”, humyns rights watch, 12/22/06, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/21/restraint-not-force-will-bring-change-cuba>, google scholar)//KW

This reluctance would be understandable but misguided. Most Cubans do want change. If they do not call for it after Mr Castro's death, it will be largely for the same reason they did not during his lifetime: the country's repressive machinery, which ruined countless lives, remains intact today.¶ If the international community misreads this silence, it will miss a historic opportunity. Immediately after Mr Castro's death, the Cuban government will be more vulnerable to pressure for change than ever before. Raúl Castro, who has already taken over the reigns of power, may wield the same old instruments of repression. But he will not enjoy his brother's revolutionary stature, which at times has been as vital as the repression for perpetuating the regime. This wind

ow of opportunity is unlikely to last. Raul Castro may never match his brother's unique combination of personal charisma and political cunning; yet, he could easily acquire the other trait that Fidel exploited so effectively: the heroic image of the Latin American David confronting the US Goliath.¶ Whether Raúl Castro can claim the "David" role will depend largely on Washington. He will be virtually guaranteed the part **if the** Bush **administration stays the** 40–year course of **unilateral embargo and unconditional ultimatum**. It is hard to think of a policy that has a longer track record of failure. Cuba is no more open now than when the embargo was first imposed four decades ago. If anything, the policy consolidated Mr Castro's hold by giving his government an excuse for its problems and a pretext for its abuses. Moreover, because **the policy was imposed in such heavy**–handed **fashion, it enabled** Mr **Castro to garner sympathy abroad**, neutralising international pressure rather than increasing it. While **other governments** may have been concerned about political repression in Cuba, they **were unwilling to be seen as siding with a bully.¶** To its credit, the Bush administration responded to news of Mr Castro's decline in August with surprising restraint, with President George W. Bush saying Cuba's citizens should determine their future. But if Washington hopes for influence in Cuba, it must do much more. First, **it will need to lift the embargo. Nothing short of this will work, not even the "calibrated response"** espoused by the Clinton administration**, in which the US would ease the embargo in response to Cuban reforms**. Why would the Cuban government make concessions when the embargo helps keep it in power?¶ Yet, it would be naïve to think the embargo's end would prompt the Cuban government to change its ways. Instead, a more measured and multilateral approach is needed, in which other governments in the region take the lead in pressing Cuba to respect political freedoms. Finding allies willing to assume this role will not be easy. But it may be the only hope for real change. By making the effort, the US could begin to reverse the dynamic that helped keep Mr Castro in power. Only when the US stops acting like Goliath will Cuba stop looking like David.

**Plan**

**Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially ease its economic sanctions toward the Republic of Cuba.**

**Transition**

**Cuban collapse inevitable—three reasons**

**Lopez-Levy 11** – Arturo Lopez Levy is lecturer and PhD Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He a Research Associate of the Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East (ISIME) and teaches Latin American Politics, and Comparative Politics at the University of Denver and the Colorado School of Mines. (“Change In Post-Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, Economic Reform and Lessons for U.S. Policy”, May 2011, New America Foundation, http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf\_all\_cuba\_reform\_final.pdf)

Cuba's Three Crises **The VI Party Congress and the reform processes it is ushering in are induced by three unresolved structural crises**. 1**. Cuba is experiencing a severe economic crisis.** 10 **Cuba is suffering its worst** **economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,** which eliminated one third of all Cuban foreign trade. Although the country is not experiencing 1991-levels of economic deprivation, **the decline in Cuba’s GDP and the country’s isolation from the world economy renders this crisis more politically devastating than that of 1991**. In the early 1990’s, the Cuban government relied on a reservoir of domestic goodwill generated by two decades of economic growth, nationalist successes (including the victories in the African Wars) and a sustained expansion of social services. Today, **the so-called “Special Period” constitutes more than 40 percent of Cuba’s post-revolutionary history**. 11 The Cuban population never expected the Special Period to go on so long. While Cuba did survive this period of extreme austerity, **younger generations of Cubans and portions of the government’s political base fault the government for not having implemented the types of structural reforms that have been adopted in** other Communist-led nations such as **the** People’s Republic of China (**PRC) and Vietnam**. 2. **The transition from Fidel Castro’s charismatic leadership to the institutionalized rule of the Communist Party is proceeding, but unfinished**. The Cuban Communist Party, as it was created after the revolution, is 46 years-old12 but still led by its first generation of leaders. Raul Castro has ruled the country since July 31, 2006, marking almost five years without any significant upheaval under his leadership, proof that **Cuba is not experiencing a crisis of governance**. But **the shift from one Castro to another was merely an intragenerational succession. First Vice-President, and now Second Secretary of the PCC, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura is one year older than Raul and the majority of the other prominent leaders are in their late seventies**. The decision to promote Machado to the second in command, first in the government, and now in the Party, can be explained by two factors: 1) the triumph of the alliance of military leaders and provincial party czars as the dominant force in Cuban elite politics (versus government bureaucrats and Fidel’s appointed ideologues), and Raul Castro’s conviction that Fidel’s policy of promotion of young cadres “by helicopter”, not in a step by step Leninist fashion was a mistake. **The Cuban political system has not yet passed the most important of tests, replacing its original generation of leaders with one of different formative experiences and vision, a successful inter-generational succession. This t**ransition also invokes questions about Cuba’s civil-military relations, since almost half of the Politburo members are generals while the Communist Party, not the Armed Forces, is purported to be the country’s leading institution. 3. **There is a crisis of confidence among domestic and foreign economic actors over the current leaderships’ commitment to carrying out the reforms needed to place Cuba on a sustainable path**. Most of the changes proposed by Raul Castro have been debated within Cuban politics debate for the last twenty years. But **the V Congress of the PCC in 1997 was a victory of conservative and bureaucratic forces opposed to the reforms13.** **As result of the stagnation that followed, significant segments of the Cuban population questioned the government’s willingness to execute the most needed changes**. After twenty years of government announcements and delays; **confidence in the leadership’s commitment to real reform is shaky**. In light of this history, part of the population views the government as oblivious to the costs of excessive gradualism or simply as trying to buy time to remain in power as long as possible, without a clear vision for the future or the will to take risks. These three crises are embedded in a long revolutionary cycle that effects five generations of Cubans14 who grew up under post-revolutionary rule. For a great number of Cubans on the island and in the Diasporas, the decisive experiences of their lives are not connected to Fidel Castro’s triumph in 1959 but instead to the “special period”. **These last twenty years of economic hardship and scarcity have diminished the Cuban population’s capacity for major political mobilization.** They have also concluded a transition from the Cuban revolution’s more radical phase to a Thermidor15, in which the post-revolutionary elite doesn’t behave as revolutionary anymore. For them, the business of revolution is now business. **The convergence of these three crises makes the current situation in Cuba particularly fragile. While the government has innumerable possibilities as to how it will bring change to Cuba, the one completely untenable choice would be to maintain the status quo.**

**AND, Specifically, reforms failing now
Tamayo 2/9**

(JUAN O. TAMAYO, Poverty in Cuba increases as government slashes social spending, expert says, 2.09.14, http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/02/08/3921652/poverty-in-cuba-increases-as-government.html)rz

Th**e reforms pushed by Cuban ruler Raúl Castro are necessary to fix the country’s economy, but are eroding social services and have not led to increased productivity**, economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago said Saturday.¶ **Social services accounted for 55 percent of the government budget and** 37 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2007-2008, one of **the highest levels in Latin America but one “that could not be sustained**,” Mesa-Lago said.¶ The latest official figures show social spending – essentially health, education and welfare – dropped to about 30 percent of GDP, said the professor emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh, who is considered the leading expert on the Cuban economy.¶ “**The result of all of this is that there’s more poverty**,” he added, estimating the poverty rate in the communist-ruled country of 11.2 million people at about 26 percent.¶ **The combination of “zigzagging” reforms and cuts in social spending “cannot end well,**” he told a seminar at the Ermita de la Caridad in Miami organized by the church as part of Catholic Social Week.¶ Cuban officials have estimated that state payrolls have a surplus of up to 1.8 million workers, he said. Yet Castro’s hopes to expand the private sector so that it can take in laid-off state workers have not come through. By the end of 2012, only 365,000 state workers had been laid off.¶ The purchasing power of salaries plunged by 73 percent since 1989 – when the Soviet Union began halting its massive subsidies to the island – while the prices of food and utilities have been rising, Mesa-Lago said.¶ Trying to improve incomes, Castro five years ago abolished salary caps, ordered that salaries be tied to productivity and made it legal to receive extra payments in hard currency and hold more than one job. Yet those changes have shown “no results at all,” he added.¶ Cuba’s public health system was once the best in Latin America, the economist said. But cuts in government spending have led to the **closure of hospitals and clinics**, reductions in diagnostic tests, shortages of medicines and long waits for surgeries.¶ The 1.8 million pensioners get an average of $10 a month, equal to about 7 percent of the GDP. With the country’s population growing older as youths leave and birth rates remain low, “that problem has **no solution** in the long run,” Mesa-Lago said.¶ Spending on public education also has been cut, but the impact has not been too harsh because there are fewer youths to enroll in schools and the government shut down costly operations, such as university classes offered at the municipal levels, he said.¶ Housing is the country’s worst problem, the economist added, with a shortage of about one million dwellings due to lack of maintenance, a growing population and damaging hurricanes. About 111,400 units were built in 2006, but only 21,000 last year.

**New reforms are not enough – embargo removal is key**

**LeoGrande 4/2/14** (Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law Is a Bet on the Future¶ By William M. LeoGrande, on April 2, 2014 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13671/cubas-new-foreign-investment-law-is-a-bet-on-the-future)//trepka

The terms of the **new foreign investment law** were foreshadowed by the terms announced last September for investors in the Mariel Special Economic Development Zone (ZED) surrounding the new modern port at **Mariel**, an hour’s drive from Havana. Designed and built by the Brazilian engineering firm Odebrecht, the port at Mariel is Cuba’s largest capital investment project in decades. Of the estimated $957 million cost, the Brazilian Development Bank provided $682 million in concessionary credits, and President Dilma Rousseff has pledged another $290 million for construction in the ZED. The new port can accommodate the large container ships that will begin transiting the Panama Canal when its “Panamax” expansion is completed in 2015. Mariel will replace Havana as the main port for Cuban trade, and aspires to become a key transshipment point for the transfer of containers to smaller ships destined for ports unable to accommodate the larger ones. In addition, Cuba hopes that the modern facilities at Mariel will help attract investors to the ZED. ¶ This is not a sure thing. First, the new port will face stiff competition from facilities already operating in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas, each of which currently handles almost six times more container traffic than the port of Havana.¶ Complicating matters, the U.S. economic embargo prohibits ships docking in Cuba from entering U.S. ports for six months, thus barring Mariel traffic from the principal transshipment destinations along the U.S. East Coast.

**AND, Plan solves a collapse – a few internal links**

**First, Lack of US trade makes collapse inevitable—aff makes reforms successful**

**Ashby 13** – Timothy is a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. (“Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States—The Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises”, March 29, 2013, <http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/>)

Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl **Castro announced that he will retire** by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process**. The death of** Venezuelan President Hugo **Chávez is likely to undermine the already ~~dysfunctional~~ Cuban economy,** if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. **This could bring social chaos,** especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. **To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned**. **The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries**. **It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental** patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: • Avoid one or more mass migrations; • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; • Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2] All of these **national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.** U.S. policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet **regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin,** whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector–including 300,000 agricultural producers–or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] **Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests.** Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5] A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products**. Normalized bilateral trade will** benefit the Cuban people by **help**ing to **provide economic stability and foster**ing **the growth of a middle class–both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions.** Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs. Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition like other parts of the economy. In December 2012, the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs in construction, transportation, and other industries. Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops “will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity.” [6] Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurism, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island’s economy to free-market competition from government-managed socialism. In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business. Of the 300 largest co-ops in the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7] Ironically, the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major U.S. policy goal.

**AND, Second is foreign investment – countries are increasingly wary of doing business with Cuba – that destroys their economy**

**Frank 10/7** (By Marc Frank¶ HAVANA | Mon Oct 7, 2013 5:47pm EDT http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/07/us-cuba-usa-idUSBRE9960N920131007)

\*\*gender modified

(Reuters) - For the 22nd consecutive year, Cuba will ask the United Nations to condemn the United States economic embargo against the island, a top Cuban official announced on Monday, accusing Washington of tightening sanctions in place for more than half a century.¶ U.S. President Barack Obama, who stated before taking office that he wanted to recast long-hostile U.S.-Cuba relations, has been a disappointment to the Cuban government, which expected him to do more to dismantle the embargo.¶ **The embargo**, fully in place since 1962**, has done "astronomical" economic harm**, Deputy Foreign Minister Abelardo Moreno said during a news conference to present Cuba's annual report on the damage wrought on the Communist-run Caribbean island by U.S. sanctions.¶ **Last year the vote at the U.N. General Assembly was overwhelming, with 188 nations** - including most of Washington's closest allies - **condemning the embargo.** Only the United States, Israel and the tiny Pacific state of Palau supported it.¶ This year the debate and vote is scheduled for October 29.¶ Obama has lifted some restrictions on travel and on the sending of remittances to the island, but Moreno said the embargo and its enforcement had been broadened in other areas.¶ "The blockade not only is being maintained, but strengthened in some aspects," Moreno charged.¶ "I ask **what right does the United States have to sanction companies that are not North American**," he said, charging that **since Obama took office in 2009, fines against embargo violators, domestic and foreign, had dramatically increased** and totaled $2.5 billion to date.¶ **Cuba says the embargo is a blockade because it punishes third country companies for doing business with Havana**. **Many critics of Cuba's one-party system, including dissidents on the island, also have called for lifting the embargo, saying it is counter-productive.**¶BANKS RELUCTANT TO DEAL WITH CUBA¶ Moreno said **foreign banks were increasingly cautious about any transactions involving Cuba due to U.S. pressure, something confirmed by numerous foreign businessmyn** in Havana.¶ "**Banks calculate the risk versus the gain in doing business with Cuba, even if transactions are legal**," said a foreign banker who asked to remain anonymous.

**AND, Independently, normalizing relations solves crisis de-escalation**

**CSG 13** – The Cuba Study Group is a non-profit and non-partisan organization studying Cuba. (“Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba”, February 2013, <http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032>)

Beyond failing to advance its stated objectives, the most counterproductive aspect of Helms-Burton is that it codifies U.S. **embargo** sanctions toward Cuba, and conditions the suspension of any and all such sanctions on congressional recognition of a transition government in Cuba. This is counterproductive in two ways. First**, it hinders the United States’ ability to respond rapidly and strategically to developments on the Island as they occur**. For example, if the Executive Branch wishes to increase assistance to the 400,000 private entrepreneurs currently operating small businesses in Cuba, it can only do so in a limited way through its licensing authority. Second, it **creates a dynamic of “all-or-nothing” conditionality that effectively places U.S. policy in the hands of the Cuban government, making it easier for Cuban officials to resist political reform and dictate the degree of American influence on the Island**. Defenders of the status quo inside the Cuban government have shown that they view greater engagement with the United States as a threat to their hold on power. As Elizardo Sanchez, the head of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights, has recognized: “The more American citizens in the streets of Cuban cities, the better for the cause of a more open society.” ¶ **The Cuban government has become increasingly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices**. This is why any sign of a thaw from the United States has repeatedly been followed by confrontation or repression, which in turn has been followed by U.S. domestic pressure to tighten economic sanctions. This pattern has become somewhat predictable, as recently exemplified by Cuba’s imprisonment of U.S. contractor Alan Gross after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and U.S. policymakers’ refusal to pursue improved bilateral relations in response.xvi It can be reasonably concluded that elements of the Cuban government do not, in fact, seek any substantial liberalization from U.S. sanctions. Indeed**, Helms-Burton provides them with an alibi for their own failures** and may well be **essential to their political survival**. Senator Jesse Helms famously said that Helms-Burton “tightened the noose around the neck of the last dictator in the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro.”xvii In practice, however, **Helms-Burton** may have **served as an incredibly convenient life raft,** giving a struggling and failing system the legitimacy that comes from the appearance of being a “state under siege.” ¶ 3. Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive ¶ Branch’s authority over Cuba policy. Over time, U.S. policies toward Communist countries with poor human rights records and histories of adversarial relations—such as China and Vietnam—have evolved toward diplomatic normalization and economic engagement. Policymakers in both parties have rightly judged that engagement, rather than isolation, better serves U.S. national ¶ interests and lends greater credibility to calls for political and economic reform. The Cuba Study Group believes the most effective way to break the deadlock of “all-or-nothing” conditionality and remedy the ineffectiveness of current U.S. policy is by de-codifying the embargo against Cuba through the repeal of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuban policy.xviii **Repealing Helm-Burton and related statutory provisions would shift the primary focus of U.S. Cuba policy away from the regime and toward empowering Cuban people. It would also enhance the leverage of the United States to promote a multilateral approach toward Cuba**, **as well as embolden reformers, democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs inside the island to press their government for greater change.¶**

**Specifically, Unconditional removal key**

**Koenig, 10** – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130>)

\*\*gender modified

The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. **The U**nited **S**tates **should take the following actions unilaterally:¶** • **Lift completely the economic embargo. Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services** between the two countries.¶ • Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.¶ • Next, **the U**nited **S**tates **should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to achieve normal trade relations** between the two countries.¶ This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36 **The U**nited **S**tates **will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address humyn rights** in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some humyn rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37¶ **So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government** most of **what they** have **wanted? Offer to return back** to Cuba **the Guantanamo Naval Base** after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative orm of government. **The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act.** “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” 38 The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base. ¶ Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.”39 These values include promoting democracy and defending humyn rights.¶ The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. **The U**nited **S**tates **would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence** the type of **changes in the Cuban government** as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world.¶ **There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade** and travel **embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government.** From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairmyn, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- **in the 50-year history** of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that **any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions** in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically **the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook**.” 40 **The U**nited **S**tates **needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime**, and have them react to actions **they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of** the second and third order effects and **their ability to control the outcome.¶ One of the first problems** for the Cuban government **after** the **removal** of the embargo **will be the excuse for the poor performing economy**. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 **This situation may present the U**nited **S**tates **with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat**.

**AND, Failure of Cuban Economic Reform guarantees Civil War**

**Lopez-Levy, ’11** Arturo, lecturer and PhD Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, May, Change In Post-Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, Economic Reform and Lessons for U.S. Policy, ACC. 6-14-2013, http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf\_all\_cuba\_reform\_final.pdf, JT//JEDI

\*\*gender modified
Indeed**, if Cuba’s economic reform fails and local revolts ensue, the most likely outcome would be more a civil war such as that seen in Libya, with** **horrific acts of war, resistance and violations of humyn rights throughout the country**. **Nationalists who are concerned about the risk of political instability and criticize the lack of a credible proposal by most Cuban opposition groups should not be dismissed as opponents of democracy.** The support for the political opposition should not be a litmus test that determines whether Washington will engage in cooperative dialogue with actors in Cuba.**¶ By ignoring both the Cuban elite’s potential for governance and the current balance of power in which the opposition is fragmented, dispersed and without a clearly-articulated governance plan, the U.S. is opting for the most unstable and uncertain road to political transition**. The immediate goals of U.S. policy towards Cuba must be to promote market growth through economic reform and a stable process of political liberalization that welcomes the growth of nonpartisan Cuban civil society organizations.¶

**AND, Cuban collapse causes hemispheric instability and makes conflicts in specific hotspots around the globe more likely**

**Gorrell, 5** - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> GWOT=Global War on Terrorism

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A **power vacuum** or **absence of order will create** the conditions for instability and **civil war**. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” **approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast.** In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., **creating a refugee crisis**.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be **forced to deploy military forces** to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be **distracted** by a ~~failed state~~ 90 miles off its coast. The administration, **given the present state of world affairs,** does not have the luxury or the **resources** to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be **long and protracted**. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. **There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots** for terrorist activity, **so these areas should be secure**. **North Korea will continue to be an un**predictable crisis in waiting. **We** also **cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation**? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily **require all** or many of the **elements of national power** to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor?

**Public pressure and lack of options ensures American draw in**

**Rodríguez 1**(L. Jacobo Rodríguez, financial services analyst, Cato Institute, Ian Vásquez, director, Project on Global Economic Liberty, Cato Institute, “Relations with Cuba,” Cato Handbook for Congress, 2001,<http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2001/9/hb107-59.pdf>)

 Unfortunately, strengthening the economic embargo has left the United¶ States in a very uncomfortable position.Washington has depleted its policy¶ options for dealing with future crises in Cuba or provocations from Castro.¶ Given the absence of other options and with the prospect of chaos on¶ America’s doorstep, U.S. officials will be under tremendous pressure to intervene militarily. Some people claim that a relaxation of the embargo¶ would deprive the United States of its most effective tool for effecting¶ change in Cuba, but tightening the embargo has left the United States¶ with only its most reckless one.¶ The Tide Is Turning¶Since the Pope’s visit to Cuba in early 1998 and the Elian Gonzalez¶ incident— the shipwrecked six-year-old lost his mother at sea and was¶ rescued by Florida fishermen during Thanksgiving weekend of 1999—¶ U.S.businesspeople, policymakers, and the U.S. population at large have¶ shown a growing interest in Cuba. For instance, in early 1998 the U.S.¶ Chamber of Commerce joined religious and humanitarian groups to create¶ a coalition to support the end of restrictions on the sale of food and¶ medicine to Cuba. In the fall of 1998, 24 senators, led by Sen. John¶ Warner (R-Va.), and several foreign policy experts, including former¶ secretaries of state Henry Kissinger, Lawrence Eagleburger, and George¶ Shultz, unsuccessfully asked President Clinton to appoint a bipartisan¶ congressional commission to reevaluate U.S. policy toward Cuba

**Multiple Scenarios**

**FIRST, US focus on Taiwan is critical to preventing war**

**Roy 12** – Dr. Denny Roy is a senior research fellow in Asian security issues with the East-West Center in Honolulu. (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan”, December 6, 2012, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/>)

China is the next superpower, the United States is in decline, and America needs to get on China’s good side. So say many analysts who have recently argued that in order to gain favor with Beijing, Washington should stop supporting Taiwan.¶ The **U.S. support at stake here includes two explicit policies and one implied policy.**¶ **Since Taiwan cannot keep up with China’s massive military expansion**, the United States sells arms to Taiwan. Washington also insists that **any settlement of the Taiwan sovereignty issue must be agreeable to Taiwan’s people**, not forced on them by Beijing. Finally, **China understands that U.S. forces might intervene if Taiwan came under military attack.**¶ The argument for abandoning Taiwan may be superficially appealing in its cold-blooded logic. But it is terribly wrong.¶ U.S. foreign policy has always been a reflection of American principles along with strategic and economic interests. **Taiwan is a legitimate democracy, one with a long history of close friendship with the United States**, **threatened by a large authoritarian state** demanding a political annexation that Taiwan’s people clearly do not want. If Americans will not stand by Taiwan, the principled component of U.S. foreign policy is dead.¶ But **abandoning Taiwan would not be merely immoral. Washington has economic, political and strategic interests in promoting democracy worldwid**e. In general, democratic governments make better international citizens than authoritarian states and are more likely to be partners than adversaries in America’s pursuit of its global agenda**. Abandoning Taiwan would not only reduce the democratic world in concrete terms** by throwing a community of 23 million people back over the barbed-wire fence. It **would also signal that America is no longer serious about promoting democratization elsewhere.**¶ Some countries in the region are willing to stand up for their own interests **against Chinese encroachment only if they have confidence in a long-term U.S. commitment to be a security partner. Other Asia-Pacific governments friendly to the United States would certainly take note if Washington sacrificed Taiwan to improve relations with China**. Not only would the U.S. reputation for reliability suffer, **but regional governments would perceive a shift in regional leadership from America to Chin**a.¶ **Absorption of Taiwan by China would make Taiwan an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the Chinese military**. Taiwan anchors the “first island chain,” limiting the Chinese Navy’s access to the Pacific Ocean. Conversely, **occupation of Taiwan would allow Chinese forces to straddle important sea lanes that are the economic lifelines of Japan and South Korea.** **Chinese control of Taiwan would greatly increase the pressure on Tokyo and Seoul, critically important U.S. allies**, to accommodate Beijing’s strategic wishes. **These alliances, and along with them the U.S. leadership role in the western Pacific, might become untenable**.¶ Although too small to act as a political “Trojan Horse” to massive China, as **a vibrant Chinese democracy Taiwan is an influential model for China.** **It is easy for Chinese to dismiss the American or Western European democracies as unsuitable or unimaginable** in a Chinese context, **but Taiwan is a different matter**. If the persistence of Taiwan as a political showcase (now viewed in person by almost two million mainland Chinese visitors annually) could constructively affect China’s political evolution toward democracy, this Taiwan contribution would be invaluable. But **Taiwan requires help to safeguard its democratic system against Chinese pressure.**¶ Advocates of abandoning Taiwan may erroneously believe that halting U.S. military and diplomatic support for Taipei would reduce tensions in East Asia. This is certainly what Beijing would have us believe. According to Chinese officials and commentators, **U.S. assistance to Taipei is all that stands in the way of peaceful unification, and without it the people of Taiwan would stop resisting and accept Beijing’s terms for unification. This premise**, however, **ignores an important reality:** the main obstacle to unification is not U.S. arms sales, but rather Taiwanese nationalism and the wish of nearly all Taiwan’s people not to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, **withdrawal of U.S. support would not necessarily lead to a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait imbroglio**. **The opposite outcome is at least as likely**. **Deterrence against an attack by the People’s Liberation Army would be weakened,** **while Taiwan’s people may well choose to fight rather than capitulate.**¶ Another dubious assumption is that removing the Taiwan issue from U.S.-China relations would clear the way for a vastly improved bilateral relationship. It **is true that Taiwan is the greatest single irritant in U.S.-China relations**, that U.S. support for Taiwan reinforces Chinese suspicions of an American “containment” strategy, and that the cross-Strait war scenario is a major rationale for China’s military modernization and buildup. **But neither U.S.-China relations nor Chinese regional behavior would improve much, if at all, as a result of a U.S. sellout of Taiwan**. **The Chinese would still have many other reasons to believe the United States is trying to keep China from rising, such as the U.S. alliances, increased American security cooperation with other governments in the region, and the alleged American “meddling” in the South China Sea dispute.**¶ There is no reason to expect that China would do more to further the American agenda on issues such as the North Korean and Iran nuclear weapons crises, since Chinese policy follows Chinese self-interests. Most importantly, **Taiwan is not the source of China-U.S. friction**. **The two main Asia-Pacific powers are engaged in a rivalry for regional leadership** and, even more fundamentally, in a struggle between two competing models for conducting international relations: one based on modern international laws and norms, and the other based on a return to the Sinocentric sphere of influence that prevailed for much of history. **Rather than satisfying and pacifying Beijing, a U.S. concession regarding Taiwan might embolden Chinese demands for more concessions aimed at further weakening America’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region**.¶ Many observers see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon, but both of these outcomes are highly uncertain. Although now in the trough of an unemployment and fiscal crisis, the United States will probably recover. Conversely, China faces serious limits to its bid for regional leadership. **These include internal vulnerabilities such as an aging population**, the potential for large-scale political turmoil caused by groups angry at the Chinese government, and the necessity of making huge and painful adjustments to the Chinese economy.¶ Externally, few states in Asia prefer Chinese to U.S. leadership. Unless China becomes overwhelmingly strong and American capabilities greatly diminish, security cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries in defense of widely-accepted norms of international behavior will be sufficient to check those Chinese aspirations that are illegitimate in that they forcibly intrude on other people’s vital interests.¶ One **of these illegitimate aspirations is the notion that China cannot be a prosperous, secure great power without politically absorbing Taiwan,** the last big piece of unfinished business from China’s “century of humiliation.” Abandoning Taiwan would, tragically, acquiesce to this notion. The threat of Taiwan independence is an unfortunate invention of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a fake threat. An **autonomous Taiwan is not preventing massive increases in China’s prosperity** and security. On the other hand, **Beijing’s threat to militarily destroy the political system and political identity chosen by Taiwan’s people is real.**¶

**AND, Taiwan is the most likely scenario for nuclear war**

**Lowther 13**– William is a staff writer for the Taipei Times, citing a CSIS report. (“Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report”, 3/16/2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>)

**Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US**, a new academic report concludes.¶ “**Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China**,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (**CSIS)**.¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that **Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence,** while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ **“Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided** since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing **Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”**¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that **neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.**¶ “This is a classic recipe for **surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation**,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future **Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor**, because **the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”**¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “**Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,”** the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “**neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions**, suggesting that **escalation management,** already a very uncertain endeavor, **could be especially difficult in any conflict**,” it says.¶ **Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky**.”¶ The report says: “**With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”**

**SECOND, Caribbean instability causes LNG and bio-terror**

**Bryan 1** (Anthony T. Bryan, director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, 10-21-2001. CFR, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, p.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and%20\_homeland\_%20security.html)

**Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception.** Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. **The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital**. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and **40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets.** Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, **terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States.** An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, **Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.**

**AND, Bioweapons cause extinction**

**Sandberg 8** Anders, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humynity Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Mynagement at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of humyn extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction>

\*\*gender modified

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humynity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more **accessible** than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become **exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been [implicated](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118564287/abstract) in the extinctions of many wild species. **Although most pandemics "fade out"** by reducing the density of susceptible populations, **pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. T**he intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing humyn **extinction**. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling [Moore's Law](http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/index.htm).

**Independently, lethality advances results in retaliation and global nuclear war
Conley 03** (Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Conley, Chief of the System Analysis Branch, Headquarters Air Combat Command, “Not with Impunity: Assessing US Policy for Retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack,” Air and Space Power Journal, Spring 2003, [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html)](http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html%29)
**The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the most important variable in determining the nature of the US reprisal**. A key question here is how many Americans would have to be killed to prompt a massive response by the United States. The bombing of marines in Lebanon, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 each resulted in a casualty count of roughly the same magnitude (150–300 deaths). Although these events caused anger and a desire for retaliation among the American public, they prompted no serious call for massive or nuclear retaliation. **The body count from a single biological attack could easily be** one or **two orders of magnitude higher** than the casualties caused by these events. Using the rule of proportionality as a guide, one could justifiably debate whether the United States should use massive force in responding to an event that resulted in only a few thousand deaths. However, what if the casualty count was around 300,000? Such an unthinkable result from a single CBW incident is not beyond the realm of possibility: “According to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, **100 kg of anthrax spores delivered by an efficient aerosol generator on a large urban target would be between two and six times as lethal as a one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb.”**46 Would **the deaths** of 300,000 Americans **be enough to trigger a nuclear response**? In this case, proportionality does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons.¶ Besides simply the total number of casualties, the types of casualties- predominantly military versus civilian- will also affect the nature and scope of the US reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a significant number of military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as they would be if the attack were against civilians.¶ World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind of event or circumstance that would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response. A CBW event that produced a shock and death toll roughly equivalent to those arising from the attack on Pearl Harbor might be sufficient to prompt a nuclear retaliation. President Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- based upon a calculation that up to one million casualties might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland47- is an example of the kind of thought process that would have to occur prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Victor Utgoff suggests that **“**if **nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best prospects for suppressing further CB attacks and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks had caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics, nuclear retaliation would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made.”48**

**AND, LNG terror causes extinction**

**Lovins 1** (Lovins and Lovins, “Brittle Power,” 2001 http://www.rmi.org/images/other/EnergySecurity/S82-03\_BrPwrParts123.pdf)

LNG is less than half as dense as water, so a cubic meter of LNG (the usual unit of measure) weighs just over half a ton. **LNG contains about thirty per-cent less energy per cubic meter than oil, but is potentially far more hazardous**. Burning oil cannot spread very far on land or water, but a cubic meter of spilled LNG rapidly boils into about six hundred twenty cubic meters of pure natural gas, which in turn mixes with surrounding air. Mixtures of between about five and fourteen percent natural gas in air are flammable. Thus **a single cubic meter of spilled LNG can make up to twelve thousand four hundred cubic meters of flammable gas-air mixture**. A single modern LNG tanker typically holds one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters of LNG, equivalent to twenty-seven hundred million cubic feet of natural gas. That gas can form between about twenty and fifty billion cubic feet of flammable gas-air mixture—several hundred times the volume of the Great Pyramid of Cheops. About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes. (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hotter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) **The resulting gas**, however, **will be so cold that it will still be denser than air**. **It will** therefore **flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source**. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes. It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles. If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating**. If ignited**, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. **Such a fireball would burn everything** within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away. An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. **No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire**.” **The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker** (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) **is equivalent to** seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about **fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.**

**Finally, no prior questions**

David **Owen**, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 200**2** p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation** of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a **theory-driven** rather than **problem-driven** approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a **plurality** of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the **action**, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be **one theoretical approach** which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises.**

# 2ac – HR Add-on

embargo violates the human rights of Cubans, lifting solves

Amnesty International 09—Non-profit organization to protect human rights (“THE US ¶ EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS”, Amnesty International, <http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/AMR25/007/2009/en/51469f8b-73f8-47a2-a5bd-f839adf50488/amr250072009eng.pdf>, Accessed 7/4/13, jtc)

“The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights”, a ¶ study prepared by Marc Bossuyt for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of ¶ Human Rights, concluded that the US embargo violates human rights law in two distinct ¶ ways. Firstly, “the fact that the United States is the major regional economic power and the ¶ main source of new medicines and technologies means that Cuba is subject to deprivations ¶ that impinge on its citizens’ human rights.” Secondly, by passing legislation that “tries to ¶ force third-party countries into embargoing Cuba as well” – the 1992 Torricelli Act – the US ¶ government attempted to turn “a unilateral embargo into a multilateral embargo through ¶ coercive measures, the only effect of which will be to deepen further the suffering of the ¶ Cuban people and increase the violation of their human rights”.34

# 2ac – Environment Add-On

**Plan solves environmental leadership**

**Conell, 9**-Research Associate at COHA (Christina, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental Duo?”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 6/12/09, [http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/)//TL](http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/%29//TL)

¶ •Cuba’s abundant natural resources need to be protected with heightened vigilance ¶ •Lifting the trade embargo would open up the possibility for a constructive partnership between Cuba and the U.S. by developing compatible and sustainable environmental policies¶ •With the support of the U.S., Cuba could become a model for sustainable preservation and environmental protection on a global scale ¶ Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. The United States should capitalize on its proximity to this resource-rich island nation by moving to normalize relations and establishing a framework for environmental cooperation and joint initiatives throughout the Americas. Cuba is the most biologically diverse of all the Caribbean Islands. Since it lies just 90 miles south of the Florida Keys, where the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico intersect, the U.S. could play a key role in environmental conservation as well as the region in general. However, when it comes to environmental preservation, the Obama administration is obstructing progress and hindering any meaningful cooperation with its current U.S.- Cuba policy. ¶ Climate change and environmental degradation are two of the most pressing contemporary issues. If President Obama is sincerely committed to environmental sustainability, he must forge international partnerships to implement this objective. Where better to begin than in the U.S.’s own backyard, where Cuba has a huge presence. Only then can Cuba and the United States move forward to find joint solutions to environmental challenges. ¶ Environmental Riches and Implications ¶ Cuba’s glittering white sand beaches, extensive coral reefs, endemic fauna and diverse populations of fish compose the Caribbean’s most biologically diverse island. Based on a per hectare sampling when compared to the U.S. plus Canada, Cuba has 12 times more mammal species, 29 times as many amphibian and reptile species, 39 times more bird species, and 27 times as many vascular plant species. Equally important, adjacent ocean currents and the island nation’s close proximity, carry fish larvae into U.S. waters, making protection of Cuba’s coastal ecosystems vital to replenishing the U.S.’s ailing fisheries. Therefore, preserving the marine resources of Cuba is critical to the economic health of North America’s Atlantic coastal communities. ¶ The U.S. and Cuba also share an ancient deepwater coral system that stretches up to North Carolina. The island’s 4,200 islets and keys support important commercial reef fish species such as snapper and grouper as well as other marine life including sea turtles, dolphins and manatees in both countries. Fifty percent of its flora and 41 percent of its fauna are endemic, signifying the importance of protecting the island’s resources in order to safeguard the paradisiacal vision that Christopher Columbus observed when landing on the island in 1492. ¶ Oro Negro and Dinero ¶ The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas development could threaten Cuba’s and Florida’s environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the exploitation of these resources. The increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environment. Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Bay of Cárdenas and related areas. Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills, which would in turn destroy the surrounding ecosystem, including fisheries and coral reef formations. The amount of pollutants released into the air from refining crude oil and the amount of wayward oil residuals would also increase with drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues are calling for immediate consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done. ¶ However the U.S.’s enormous oil usage and its development requirements will cultivate economic growth on the island. Washington must work with Cuba to create an ecological protection plan not only to establish an environmentally friendly public image, but to make it a reality as well. Degradation of the environment will deprive Cuba, in the long run, of one of its most important sources of present and future revenue: tourism. Consequently, it is in the mutual interests of the U.S. and Cuba to develop a cooperative relationship that will foster tourism and growth in a sustainable manner. ¶ Sustainability through Collaboration ¶ In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to preserve elements of Cuba’s past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special permission. A number of tourist resorts already dot the island, but Cuba has been largely exempt from mass tourist exploitation due to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the island remains underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked power to back policies, which have been heedless to environmental considerations, thus damaging some of the island’s pristine ecosystem that once defined the island. Roughly the size of Pennsylvania, Cuba is the largest Caribbean island, and if preservation and conservation measures are planned and carried out in a cognizant manner, it could become a paradigm for sustainable development at the global level. ¶ The Obama administration’s recent easing of travel restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives on the island could be of immense importance not only to Cuban families, but also to the preservation of Cuba’s unique and increasingly threatened coastal and marine environments. Such a concession on Washington’s part would mark a small, but still significant stride in U.S.-Cuba relations, yet the travel restrictions still remain inherently discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow only a certain category of Americans into Cuba signify only a meager shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba. ¶ The 50-year-old U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. Obama’s modifications fall short of what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba relationship. Cuba’s tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas have suffered degradation as a result of harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic system. Cuba’s economy could be reinvigorated through expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of commodity exports, including sugarcane for ethanol. U.S. policy toward Cuba should encourage environmental factors, thereby strengthening U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. ¶ An environmental partnership between the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in development models that could serve as an example for environmental strategies throughout the Americas. The U.S. has the economic resources necessary to aid Cuba in developing effective policy, while the island provides the space where sustainable systems can be implemented initially instead of being applied after the fact.

**Extinction**

**Diner, 94**[David, Ph.D., Planetary Science and Geology, "The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?," Military Law Review, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161]

To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew 74 could save [hu]mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to[hu]man[s] in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a speciesaffects other species dependent on it. 75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. 77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. 78 [\*173] Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, **each new** animal or plant **extinction,** with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, **could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction.** Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss